As noted by the author Gregory Messenger in the chapter “Reforming the Law and Institutions of the WTO: The Dangers of Unexpected Consequences”, of the book “The Reform of International Economic Governance:” “The negotiating history indicates that the GATT Contracting Parties expected dispute settlement under the WTO to be an entirely different creature to that found in other areas of international law.” Indeed, as noted by the author, none of the parties expected the final outcome of the negotiations and the shape and role that the DSB is currently having. Upon the establishment of the mechanism, each party had its own expectations.

The story of the establishment of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is an interesting one. Indeed, none of the parties expected the final outcome of the negotiations and the shape and role that the DSB is currently having. Upon the establishment of the mechanism, each party had its own expectations. For instance, the European Economic Community (EEC) made the following observation: “The [dispute settlement] machinery cannot and must not be used to create, through a process of deductive interpretation, new obligations for contracting parties, or to replace the negotiating process. One of the objectives of the Uruguay Round is to eliminate certain ambiguities and diverging interpretations of the General Agreement and Codes, and this will make a fundamental contribution to dispute settlement.” One could obviously understand the rationale behind such statement as all the parties were looking to preserve their interests without allowing a new international instrument to exercise primacy through the international trade rules and decide over trade matters. For instance, several comparisons were made with the pervious mechanism that existed during the years (1947–1995). What was noticeable after 1995 is that lawyers have replaced diplomats reflecting thus the technical nature of the new mechanism and the need to solve trade conflicts. Yet, still, none of the negotiators expected the final outcome and level of technicality that the DSB has managed to reach which allowed solving highly complex cases. This reality could be noticed for instance when one examines the developing role of the Appellate Body (AB) and the important role given to the interpretations made by the AB which seeks to clarify international trade rules. During the establishment of the DSU, the development of the role of the AB was not a certainty and none of the negotiators gave particular importance to the instrument. Indeed, this reality is reflected in the description that was given to the role of the AB through Article 17.1 of the DSU which included an extremely basic explanation. According to the said Article: “A standing Appellate Body shall be established by the DSB. The Appellate Body shall hear appeals from panel cases. It shall be composed of seven persons, three of whom shall serve on any one case. Persons serving on the Appellate Body shall serve in rotation. Such rotation shall be determined in the working procedures of the Appellate Body”. In the chapter “Reforming the Law and Institutions of the WTO: The Dangers of Unexpected Consequences”, of the book “The Reform of International Economic Governance”, the author Gregory Messenger discussed the historical development of the role of the DSU since the Uruguay round while also making comparisons with the mechanism that already existed from 1947 to 1995. In the author’s words: “The negotiating history indicates that the GATT Contracting Parties expected dispute settlement under the WTO to be an entirely different creature to that found in other areas of international law.”

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